Written by: Lamkholal Doungel
The Memorandum of Settlement (MoS) signed on March 15, 2026, between the Government of Assam and the Kuki Suspension of Operations (SoO) groups marks an important development in Assam’s peace process.
Signed with the Kuki Revolutionary Army (KRA), United Kuki Gam Defence Army (UKDA), Kuki Liberation Army (KLA), and the Hmar group HPC (D), the agreement seeks to end years of insurgency in Assam.
For the Government, the MoS represents another attempt to resolve ethnic militancy through dialogue. For the Kuki community, however, it carries deeper political significance rooted in identity and representation.
Yet, even before implementation began, the agreement faced opposition from several organisations in Karbi Anglong and Dima Hasao. The controversy demonstrates that in Assam’s ethnically diverse hill areas, political settlements are often interpreted through concerns over autonomy, representation, and demographic balance.
The political aspirations of the Kukis in Assam, particularly in Karbi Anglong, are neither recent nor incidental. The demand for a Kuki Tribes Autonomous Regional Council (KTARC) emerged in the early 1990s from concerns over representation, neglect, and development.
The movement gained organised expression in 1992 with the formation of the Kuki National Assembly (KNA), which spearheaded the demand for a separate Regional Council within Karbi Anglong under the Sixth Schedule.
Although overshadowed by the larger Autonomous State movement led by the Autonomous State Demand Committee (ASDC), official assessments during the 1990s acknowledged Kuki grievances, including uneven development, lack of decentralisation, and limited participation of Kuki villages in decision-making within the Karbi Anglong Autonomous Council (KAAC).
Reports also recognised the distinct identity and customary practices of the Kukis while noting that their demand for a Regional Council was reasonable and justifiable.
Even today, the Kukis continue to have no meaningful representation within the KAAC, whether through elected or nominated positions.
This absence has deepened feelings of exclusion and strengthened demands for an institutional mechanism to safeguard their interests and ensure equitable participation.
The issue entered a new phase in 2000 when a faction of the ASDC agreed in principle to support a separate autonomous arrangement for the Kukis. However, the development also triggered opposition from certain Karbi militant groups, contributing to heightened ethnic tensions.
The Kuki–Karbi clashes of 2003–2004 proved to be a major setback. The violence weakened the Kuki movement and deepened mistrust between communities.
Although the demand for KTARC lost visibility after the conflict, it remained one of the core aspirations later pursued by the Kuki SoO groups during negotiations with the Government.
The Kuki demand for a Regional Council derives constitutional legitimacy from the Sixth Schedule, which provides for autonomous regions and Regional Councils for distinct Scheduled Tribes within an autonomous district.
Kuki leaders have consistently argued that if greater autonomy is legitimate for larger hill communities, the aspirations of smaller tribal minorities also deserve recognition.
The demand also draws inspiration from the former Pawi-Lakher Regional Council, established in 1953 under the Sixth Schedule, which later evolved into the Lai, Mara, and Chakma Autonomous Councils in Mizoram.
The Kukis therefore maintain that their demand is neither unprecedented nor outside the constitutional framework envisaged for tribal areas in Northeast India.
The present MoS emerged after years of armed conflict and negotiation. The Kuki militant groups entered into a Suspension of Operations agreement with the Government in 2012, followed by talks involving the Centre, the Assam Government, and the Kuki SoO groups.
The significance of the 2026 MoS lies not only in what was granted but also in what was relinquished. The Kuki groups eventually agreed to give up their long-standing demand for a KTARC in exchange for a Kuki Welfare and Development Council (KWDC).
For many within the Kuki community, this represented a major compromise. While the Welfare and Development Council was welcomed as a step towards socio-economic upliftment, many viewed it as falling short of the original political demand.
Nevertheless, acceptance of the agreement reflected the willingness of the Kuki leadership to prioritise peace and democratic engagement.
Soon after the signing of the MoS, objections emerged from several organisations in Karbi Anglong and Dima Hasao. Concerns centred on representation in the KAAC and the North Cachar Hills Autonomous Council (NCHAC), as well as apprehensions that the proposed Development Councils might weaken the Sixth Schedule framework.
The concept of Development Councils for minority communities was not entirely new. Similar recommendations had appeared earlier in D.P. Goala’s recommendations concerning Dima Hasao, aimed at ensuring inclusive development for non-majority communities.
The Government later clarified that the proposed changes would not affect the territorial jurisdiction, demographic balance, or political majority of the Karbi and Dimasa communities.
It also stated that the Kuki and Hmar Welfare and Development Councils were intended primarily as socio-economic and cultural bodies working with the existing Autonomous Councils.
Despite these assurances, opposition continued in some quarters. This underlines a larger challenge confronting peace settlements in ethnically diverse regions: even accommodative measures are often interpreted through the lens of ethnic competition and political insecurity.
At the same time, the controversy should not obscure another important reality: relations among communities at the ground level did not entirely collapse into hostility.
This suggests that the debate surrounding the MoS reflects deeper political anxieties embedded within the structure of autonomy and representation in the hill districts.
The Kukis and Hmars have long been integral to the region’s socio-political fabric. Their aspirations, like those of other communities, deserve recognition.
The Kuki MoS therefore represents both an achievement and a test. It is an achievement because it seeks to bring closure to a long-standing conflict through dialogue and compromise. It is also a test because its success will ultimately depend on how it is perceived, implemented, and accepted across communities.
In a diverse democracy like India, the aspirations of even the smallest communities deserve accommodation. Sustainable peace in multi-ethnic societies must also be built on dignity, mutual respect, and the assurance that no community’s voice remains permanently unheard.
Ultimately, the future of this MoS will depend not merely on the provisions contained in the agreement but on the willingness of all stakeholders to move beyond suspicion towards trust and coexistence.
The Kuki MoS should therefore be viewed not merely as a settlement for one community but as part of a broader democratic effort to balance competing aspirations within Assam and India.
Lamkholal Doungel is an Associate Professor and Head of the Political Science department at DHSK College in Dibrugarh, Assam.