Guwahati: The Gauhati High Court has struck down a provision of an Arunachal Pradesh law that allowed the minister in charge of Urban Local Bodies to hear appeals against decisions of the State Election Commissioner in municipal defection cases, ruling that such an arrangement does not provide an independent and impartial adjudicatory forum.
A division bench of Justices Kardak Ete and Budi Habung, however, upheld the provision empowering the chief secretary to act as the appellate authority under the Arunachal Pradesh Urban Local Bodies (Disqualification on Grounds of Defection) Act, 2014.
The judgment was delivered on August 18 on a writ petition filed by three elected councillors of the Pasighat Municipal Council- Ponung Radeng Saring, Yalop Nyigang Yomso and Rebeka Panyang.
The petitioners had challenged the constitutional validity of sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 6 of the Act after the chief secretary issued a notice on December 11, 2024, directing them to appear in Appeal No. 01/2024. However, they did not challenge the notice or the proceedings arising from it.
Section 6 provides for an appeal against a decision of the State Election Commissioner in defection-related disqualification cases before the Chief Secretary. Its proviso states that if the Chief Secretary was also serving as the State Election Commissioner, the appeal would instead lie before the minister in charge of Urban Local Bodies.
The court distinguished between the two appellate authorities, noting that the chief secretary, while exercising powers under the Act, acts pursuant to a statutory mandate and is required to decide appeals in accordance with the law and principles of natural justice.
The minister in charge, by contrast, is part of the elected political executive and is responsible for administering the concerned department, the bench observed.
According to the court, giving a member of the political executive jurisdiction over cases involving the disqualification of elected representatives creates a “reasonable apprehension” about the institutional impartiality of the appellate forum.
The bench clarified that the issue was not whether an individual minister would necessarily act unfairly or misuse the authority, but whether the institutional structure itself was capable of maintaining public confidence in the independence of the adjudicatory process.
“An adjudicatory mechanism must not only be fair in fact but must also be structured in a manner which inspires confidence in its independence and impartiality,” the court observed.
The bench noted that defection proceedings can directly determine whether elected representatives continue in office and can also affect the composition of elected local bodies. It therefore held that the appellate forum must assure parties that such disputes would be decided on the basis of statutory provisions and the material before the authority, rather than political or administrative considerations.
Applying the doctrine of severability, the court held that the constitutional defect was limited to the proviso granting appellate jurisdiction to the minister. The remaining provisions of the appellate mechanism could continue to operate independently.
The court accordingly declared unconstitutional and struck down the proviso to Section 6(1) insofar as it provided for an appeal before the minister in charge of Urban Local Bodies.
At the same time, it upheld the remaining portion of Section 6(1), which provides for appeals before the chief secretary, along with Section 6(2), which lays down the procedure to be followed by the appellate authority.
The court also rejected the wider argument that decisions of the State Election Commissioner could only be challenged through judicial review and could not be subjected to a statutory appeal.
It held that judicial review under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and a statutory appeal operate in separate fields. The existence of an appellate remedy, therefore, does not exclude or limit the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court.
Senior advocate T.T. Tara, assisted by G. Bam, appeared for the petitioners, while Advocate General I. Chowdhury represented the state respondents.
The state had argued that the legislature was competent under Entry 5 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to enact laws relating to local government. It also maintained that an executive authority could perform quasi-judicial functions when such powers were conferred by statute.
The court made it clear that it had not examined the legality or merits of Appeal No. 01/2024 or the notice issued by the chief secretary in December 2024.
The writ petition was therefore partly allowed, with the challenge to Sections 6(1) and 6(2) rejected except to the extent of the proviso that vested appellate powers in the minister.