“I cycle every night from Paro to Thimphu. I find it meditative.” I was sitting across the Fourth King (K4) of Bhutan, listening in awe as the Druk Gyalpo or the “Dragon King” of the Himalayan kingdom narrated tales about his tryst with quiet contemplation. In 2013, when I met him, the ruler had, of course, passed on his reign to his son, Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck. But the “relinquishing” of power was perhaps more by way of grooming his son for the higher duties of a monarch. In more ways than one, the K4 decreed over the realm and was perhaps one of the most revered personalities in South Asia. In Bhutan, he was a celestial being whose word was divinely ordained without question.
I had been warned that I had to be extremely demure in my conversation with the King. I could not, for instance, question him, nor broach a subject, private or public, unless he so desired. I was naturally brimming with multiple queries, but rules are rules, and there was no way I could get around them. But there was something uncanny about the K4. He could—like some medieval oracle—fathom all the question marks that were running inside my mind and would very soon veer the subject towards the topic that I was mentally broaching.
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Our conversation veered to other aspects. He told me in great detail about the manner in which he led the Royal Bhutan Army (RBA) in 2003 into battle against the Indian insurgents that had been operating against India from his country. He told me that it was perhaps one of the few times that he wore military fatigues, and that the name of the operation, which has come to be popularly known as “All Clear,” was a creation of the Indian media. His government or the RBA never named it thus. He later sent me to Dochula Pass where the eldest Queen Mother, Ashi Dorji Wangmo Wangchuck, had constructed 108 chortens or stupas known as “Druk Wangyal Chortens.”
These chortens of victory were made in honor of the Bhutanese soldiers who were killed in the December 2003 battle against the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), and the Kamatapur Liberation Organisation (KLO), who had established bases in Southern Bhutan and were using their bases in the Himalayan kingdom as launching pads against India. I was very excited to learn about the Queen Mother. After all, she and her three sisters, whom the K4 had wed, were the female siblings of my course mate in St. Stephen’s College, Ugen Dorji. The K4 also got me to meet the then Prime Minister of Bhutan, the Cabinet Secretary, and the Chief Operations Officer.
I had, as a student of St. Stephen’s College, visited Pakistan as a State Guest on the personal invitation of the then President of Pakistan, Gen. Zia-ul-Haq. I also met the then Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Lt. Gen. Sahabzada Mohammad Yaqub Ali Khan, who was not only from my alma mater, the Royal Indian Military College, Dehra Dun, but my section-type (Rawlinson/Pratap) as well.
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In any event, the over two-hour-long “exchange” also touched upon India-Bhutan relations against the backdrop of the Chinese shadow. But to be truthful, it did not go beyond the generic. In any event, the meeting with Jigme Singye Wangchuck was one of the most unbelievable experiences of my life.
India and Bhutan had signed a Treaty of Friendship on August 8, 1949, whereby the two nations agreed on non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. However, Bhutan consented to allow India to “guide” its foreign policy, and that both countries would consult each other on foreign and defense matters. However, as Bhutan began moving towards democracy, there were demands from Bhutan to revisit the treaty. Consequently, on February 8, 2007, a new treaty was signed between Pranab Mukherjee, the then Minister of External Affairs of India, and Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck, the then Crown Prince and now King of Bhutan. The new treaty brought two major changes to the earlier treaty of 1949. The most important one is the removal of the clause on the “advice of the Government of India in Bhutan’s external affairs.” The revised Article 2 reads:
“In keeping with the abiding ties of close friendship and cooperation between Bhutan and India, the Government of the Kingdom of Bhutan and the Government of the Republic of India shall cooperate closely with each other on issues relating to their national interests. Neither Government shall allow the use of its territory for activities harmful to the national security and interest of the other.”
As a result, Bhutan presently has adequate space to conduct its foreign relations without consulting India. The new treaty also allows Bhutan to import arms, ammunition, etc., which are vital to strengthening the security of Bhutan in consultation with India. Essentially, the Indo-Bhutan relationship is grounded in Bhutan’s sovereignty and securing India’s strategic interests.
On October 14, 2021, even as the Galwan crisis was simmering, Bhutan and China signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on a “three-step roadmap” for expediting negotiations on their boundary dispute. It prompted a cautious response from India against the backdrop of the standoff in Eastern Ladakh. Certain observers felt that Bhutan was drifting away from India. But it is my considered view that that is not the case. Thimphu would have—if not publicly—certainly consulted New Delhi before it signed the MoU. As a matter of analysis, it seems that India actually encouraged Bhutan to speed up the boundary negotiations with China. Such a move is important because China is—as things stand at present—not likely to make any concessions in the territory that has strategic implications in the Tibet Autonomous Region.
Scenario building suggests that China could retain the option to militarily invade Bhutan to occupy more tactically important territory. Simultaneously, it can create a situation to offset India’s military maneuverability by exerting pressure on the disputed border with India or its friendly neighbors and by threatening to invade earlier claimed areas of Bhutan, the loss of which will have strategic implications for India in the Eastern Sector. Indeed, there was enough indication that China was seeking to reach the Jampheri Ridge and even cross the Torsa Nullah (a veritable “red line” that India has laid down which cuts through the Doklam Plateau, bifurcating its north and south aspects!) by building a road during the Doklam crisis, the completion of which would have threatened the sensitive Siliguri Corridor. It is an interesting observation, but I have been informed by reliable sources that the streetlights of Siliguri can be seen from atop the Jampheri Ridge at night.
I recall mentioning this aspect when I delivered my keynote address at a 33 Corps seminar on April 13, 2024: the venue of the seminar was Bengdubi, and my good friend, Lt. Gen. VPS Kaushik, was the Corps Commander. Gen. Kaushik surprised me by honoring me with a “Scroll of Honor” at the end of the seminar. The seminar was attended, among others, by luminaries like Lt. Gen. Shokin Chauhan, Jayadeva Ranade, Lt. Gen. Raj Shukla, Lt. Gen. Rakesh Sharma, and Maj. Gen. A.K. Bardalai.
Also, there is sufficient indication to suggest that there is PLA build-up opposite Eastern Bhutan, which abuts the Kameng Sector of Arunachal Pradesh. China had already claimed the Sakteng Sanctuary of Bhutan in 2017. The aforesaid mobilization—which has also been corroborated by satellite imageries—assesses that there could be a new threat to the Kameng Sector, which houses the sensitive Tawang region, from the west and the south. So far, despite China’s rhetoric about its claim over Tawang, the area of Tashigang in Eastern Bhutan has acted as a natural barrier to any military threat to the Kameng Sector. Chinese move towards the Sakteng wildlife sanctuary could, therefore, pose a new danger to the Kameng sector.
Therefore, a strategic move by India whereby it supports a Sino-Bhutanese boundary agreement would be prudent. After all, a bilaterally negotiated boundary between Bhutan and China would amount to India having a strategic buffer in Bhutan. It would stave off any Chinese moves to make inroads into Bhutan in the manner it sought to do during the Doklam crisis. If correctly concluded, China would not be able to renege on its boundary agreement with Bhutan without incurring international censure. An iron-clad Sino-Bhutanese boundary would thereby act as a veritable wall against any nefarious moves by China against India in the Eastern Sector.
Jaideep Saikia is India’s foremost strategist and bestselling author.